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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
only rationale which has been given for the doctrine of charitable im-
munity is that charities need financial encouragement and stimulation. "5
However, payment by the individual claimant does not substantially
affect the financial need of the institution involved.
In Washington the basis of charitable immunity has been a policy of
promoting charitable ministrations to "the halt, the lame and the blind,
and to ... those suffering from physical or mental disease and afflic-
tion.""8 Although charities no longer need special financial encourage-
ment and stimulation," a rule of liability rather than immunity in the
case of the nonpaying beneficiary would be more consistent with this
policy. As stated in the famous case, President & Directors of George-
town College v. Hughes:
Abolition of the immunity as to the paying patient is justified as the
last short step but one to extinction. Retention for the nonpaying patient
is the least defensible and most unfortunate of the distinction's refine-
ments. He, least of all, is able to bear the burden. More than all others,
he has no choice. He is the last person the donor would wish to go
without indemnity. With everyone else protected, the additional burden
of protecting him cannot break the trust. He should be the first to have
reparation, not last and least among those who receive it. So stripped of
foundation, the distinction falls. It should fall in line with, not away
from, the trend which has brought it about. The immunity should go
and the object of the charity should be placed on a par with all others.38
The error of the Lyon and Pedersen cases lies not only with the per-
petuation of an outmoded and unjust doctrine of law, but with the lack
of reasoned discussion. This defect is especially noticeable because of
the excellence of the Pierce opinion. In this extensive opinion Judge
Hamley disposed of every rationale upon which charitable immunity is
based. In a page or two the Lyon and Pedersen cases, without discus-
sion, have restored immunity. One may well ask, at this point, what
stare decisis means in Washington. CHAPLES F. ABBOTT, JR.
Occupier's Liability-The Licensee and Invitee in Washington.
Since their development by the English court in Indermaur v. Dames,'
aSMagnuson v. Swedish Hosp., 99 Wash. 399, 408, 169 Pac. 828, 831 (1918).
30 Ibid.
37 Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 43 Wn.2d 162, 169-71, 260 P2d
765, 769-70 (1953).
38 130 F.2d 810, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
1 L.R. 1 C.P. 247, 35 LJ.C.P. 184 (1866), aff'd, L.R. 2 C.P. 311, 36 L.J.C.P. 181
(1867).
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the categories of trespasser, licensee and invitee have played a signifi-
cant role in the law of torts. Though they were founded upon nine-
teenth century notions of liability, and reflect an age which had not yet
discarded the feudal principles of landowner's sovereignty, these dis-
tinctions have persisted, plaguing courts and litigants alike. While
other archaic rules have fallen before the demands of our industrial
complex and rising social consciousness, these classifications have en-
dured. Since few valid reasons can be given for their longevity, the dis-
tinctions are slowly losing standing under a seige of exception and modi-
fication. To request the modern jurist to conform to a rule which limits
recovery to "wilful and wanton injury," to ask him to disregard the
negligence principles so painstakingly developed through a century of
litigation, seems too great a demand. Thus, with increasing frequency
the categories have been eroded by exceptions or ignored, to be replaced
by current negligence concepts. A recent Washington case, Ward v.
Thompson,2 presents a summary indication of this trend.
In Ward, the respondent, without payment and by request, was
assisting his stepson in constructing a house, and was injured when a
scaffolding upon which he stood collapsed. The trial court concluded
that the stepfather was a business invitee and upon this ground entered
judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal the stepson sought to prove his
stepfather a licensee, who-under the Washington rule3-- may hold the
occupier accountable only for wilful or wanton injuries.
With the question thus presented, the court was afforded an oppor-
tunity to review and assess the current position of the licensee and
invitee distinctions in determining a landoccupier's liability. The prod-
uct of this review reflects the court's objection to the restrictions im-
posed upon it by these timeworn distinctions, and further diminishes
their influence in resolving liability.
In order to be classified a business invitee, the Washington court
requires a showing: "that the business or purpose for which the visitor
comes upon the premises is of a material or pecuniary benefit, actual or
potential, to the owner or occupier of the premises."" Essentially, this
definition of invitee and the test by which such status is determined is
the same as that adopted by the American Law Institute in the Re-
- 57 Wn.2d 655, 359 P2d 143 (1961).
3 In Porter v. Ferguson, 53 Wn.2d 693, 694, 336 P.2d 133, 134 (1959), the court
pointed out that since "the occasion of the visit was social and not commercial or
contractual in nature ... the defendants, as occupiers, owed to the licensees only the
duty of not willfully or wantonly injuring them under the Washington rule .
4 Dotson v. Haddock, 46 Wn.2d 52, 55, 278 P2d 338, 340 (1955).
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statement of Torts5 and a minority of American courts.6 Under this
economic benefit theory the occupier owes a duty of affirmative care as
the price of the pecuniary benefit expected from the visit.'
In Washington the pecuniary requirement has had a particularly
harsh effect; for all practical purposes the plaintiff has had to be an
invitee in order to recover. The occupier owes the invitee an affirmative
duty to inspect and discover hidden dangers on the land,' while his only
duty to a licensee is to refrain from wilfully or wantonly injuring him.'
To constitute a wilful or wanton injury, "the act which produced it
must have been knowingly and intentionally committed or it must have
been committed under such circumstances as to evince a reckless dis-
regard for the safety of the person injured."' ° Because of this rule, the
court has gone to great length to find the necessary economic benefit."'
This tendency has led to much confusion in the Washington cases. Inso-
far as the rules are fairly explicit, there would be little difficulty if the
categories were applied as they are defined; however, such is not the
present practice. When cases invoking the "status rules of conduct" are
examined, results which would almost uniformly be the same had ordi-
nary negligence principles been employed are revealed. As a conse-
quence, the wilful or wanton limitation is either ignored or dismissed in
questionable cases and the plaintiff is declared a business invitee. The
Washington court has recognized and has commented on this process. 2
A curious development in this respect is the court's recent adoption
of a rule which presumes that services between members of a family
52 RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 332, at 897 (1934). Comment a defines a business visitor
as "a person who is invited or permitted to enter or remain on the land in the pos-
session of another for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings
between them."
6 PRossER, TORTS § 78, at 456 (2d ed. 1955). "The Restatement notwithstanding,
the [invitation test] is now accepted by the great majority of the courts ......
72 HARPER & JAams, ToRTs § 27.12, at 1478 (1956). "The economic benefit theory
proceeds on the assumption that affirmative obligations are imposed on people only in
return for some consideration or benefit." See also, PROSsER, TORTS § 78, at 454
& n.91 (2d ed. 1955).
8 Dotson v. Haddock 46 Wn.2d 52 55, 278 P.2d 338, 340 (1955).
9 McNamara v. Hall, 38 Wn.2d 864, 867, 233 P.2d 852, 855 (1951).
10 Ibid.
11 Two interesting examples of this are: Kalinowski v. Y.W.C.A., 17 Wn2d 380,
135 P,2d 852 (1943) ; and Heckman v. Sisters of Charity, 5 Wn.2d 699, 106 P2d 593
(1940).
12 In Garner v. Pacific Coast Coal Co., 3 Wn.2d 143, 149, 100 P.2d 32, 35 (1940),
the court said, in reference to another of its opinions, "It is apparent .. . that the
court felt that. . . the plaintiff should be permitted to recover. It is also apparent that
the court was of the view that, if the plaintiff was a mere licensee, he could not
recover... The facts there undoubtedly presented what is often termed a 'hard case,'
and in order to sustain a cause of action, the court was driven to the extreme of holding
... that the plaintiff was an invitee."
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are gratuitous and are not an economic benefit as that term is used in
the test.'3 Yet in Ward the court made no mention of this presumption.
The court looked to the economic benefit conferred upon the appellant,
rather than to the gratuitous nature of the respondent's acts.
In concluding that Mr. Ward was an invitee, the court did not stop
with satisfying the economic benefit test, but also applied the "invitation
theory." This theory, currently followed in a majority of jurisdictions, "
does not require economic benefit, even though that element may be
present. The test is whether
the occupier by his arrangement of the premises or other conduct has
led the entrant to believe that [the premises] were intended to be used
by visitors for the purpose which the entrant was pursuing, and that
such was not only acquiesced in by the owner [or possessor] but that
it was in accordance with the intention and design with which the way
or place was adapted and prepared."5
Under this approach, liability is predicated upon an implied represen-
tation that reasonable care has been taken to make the place safe for
those who come for the occupier's purpose and at his invitation.6
Though the test has not been construed to include purely social vis-
itors," one writer points out that many visitors from whose presence no
pecuniary benefit can be derived are nevertheless held to be invitees.'8
Further, in actual application, the invitation test accounts more satis-
factorily than the economic benefit test for many of the decisions which
hold the plaintiff to be a licensee. Professor James points out that,
In a great many situations, these two tests will yield the same result,
but they do not overlap each other completely. The adoption of either
test alone will exclude from the class of invitees some entrants who
would qualify as invitees under the other test. The actual course of
13 See Porter v. Ferguson, 53 Wn2d 693, 694, 336 P2d 133, 134 (1959), a case of
first instance on the status of parents when visiting a child's home. In denying the
plaintiff recovery, the court cited 2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 331, at 896 (1934), which
states that ordinarily members of the possessor's household are "gratuitous licensees."
From this statement, the court has derived a "presumption that services between mem-
bers of a family enjoying normal relationships are gratuitous." In Lucas v. Barner,
56 Wn.2d 136, 351 P2d 492 (1960), the court held that the presumption of gratuity was
not rebutted by evidence that the parties contemplated entering into a contractual
relationship.
14 PRossER, TORTS § 78, at 456 (2d ed. 1955).
152 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 27.12, at 1479 (1956).
'6PRossER, TORTS § 78, at 455 (2d ed. 1955).
17 See the discussion and cases cited in 2 HARPER & JAmEs, TORTS § 27.12, at 1479-
80 (1956). In Guilford v. Yale, 128 Conn. 449, 23 A.2d 917, 919 (1942), it was stated
that "a mere passive acquiescence by an owner or occupier in a certain use of his land
by others involves no liability;" this seems the usual situation with regard to the
purely social visitor.
13 PRosSER, TORTS § 78, at 456 (2d ed. 1955).
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decisions has been towards broadening the class of invitees. It is sub-
mitted that under the rule today, the plaintiff may, and should be,
classified as an invitee if either the economic benefit or invitation
theory is satisfied. 9
In Ward, the court found sufficient pecuniary benefit to satisfy the
economic benefit test, yet it went on to discuss and apply the invitation
theory.2" While such a reference does not constitute a definite commit-
ment to the invitation theory and does not insure its future application,
it does indicate a desire to lay a broader and sounder foundation for
the categories' application. Since an adoption of the invitation test
would dispose of the pecuniary requirement and would afford the court
a greater degree of latitude, it seems doubtful that the court will with-
draw, having approached this position.
Ward is also significant because the court adopted for the first time
a "dangerous condition or instrumentalities exception." After asserting
that the respondent was an invitee under either the economic benefit
or invitation tests, the court went on to state that
aside from the technicalities of the respondent's legal status... the
appellants owed a duty to maintain the scaffolding in a reasonably safe
condition.... The duty of the appellant ... cannot be altered on the
basis of timeworn distinctions between licensees and inzitees....
Where the danger of harm is great... public policy demands that the
occupier take the utmost precaution to keep such equipment in a safe
condition.21 (Emphasis added.)
This "dangerous condition or instrumentalities exception" has often
been applied in other jurisdictions.22 Though it has been alluded to in
previous Washington cases,23 the court denied in 1955 that it had ever
29 James, Duties Owed to Licensees and Invitees, 63 YALE L.J. 605, 612 (1954).
20Ward v. Thompson, 57 Wn2d 655, 658-59, 359 P.2d 143, 145 (1961). "[Rle-
gardless of which test we apply, respondent qualifies as a (business) invitee. . . .The
fact that Respondent was not paid for his services is of no consequences under either
of the above tests. At most, economic benefit to the occupier is required, and at the very
least respondent conferred it in this case."
21 Ward v. Thompson, 57 Wn.2d 655, 659-60. 359 P.2d 143, 145 (1961).
22 PRossER, op. cit. supra note 18, § 76 at 437-38.
2
3 Clark v. Longview Pub. Serv. Co., 143 Wash. 319, 323, 255 Pac. 380, 381-82
(1927), ruled that "The duty which the owner of high-voltage electricity owes to all
persons-whether invitees, licensees, or trespassers-who it may have reason to believe
may come into its proximity, is to guard them from injury resulting from the danger-
ous appliances; and it cannot relieve itself from liability, even as against a trespasser,
by showing that it merely refrained from inflicting wanton and wilful injury." This
exception was also noted in Christensen v. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 16 Wn.2d 424,
432, 133 P.2d 797, 800 (1943), where the court stated that the wilful or wanton rule
"does not exclude liability on the part of the owner or proprietor for extraordinary
concealed perils against which the licensee cannot protect himself, or for unreasonable
risks incident to the possessor's activities."
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been called upon to decide if this exception obtains in Washington."
Indeed, in the 1951 decision of McNamara v. Hall,2 counsel urged the
adoption of a rule which would put the occupier under a duty to warn
a licensee of any concealed or hidden dangers on the land. The court
refused to accept this, on the ground that it would constitute an un-
needed departure from the wilful or wanton limitation. In Ward, how-
ever, the court adopted a broader exception on its own motion. This
proposition is based on the existence of a duty regardless of the time-
worn invitee-licensee classifications. The rule thus announced has since
been applied by the court in Haugen v. Central Lutheran Church," and
carries with it the earlier notion that, "though in fixing the measure of
legal duty it is convenient to identify a particular relationship with one
of the common-law labels, ... it is not always practical to do so. Nor is
this in all cases essential to a correct appraisal of correlative rights and
duties.) 27
This is a recurring theme in many of the courts' recent opinions.
For example, in Mills v. Orcas Power and Light Co.,2" the defendant
urged the court to apply the label "trespasser" to flying aircraft. The
court refused to include aircraft in any of the established categories,
stating that it would constitute "using the letter of the law to kill its
spirit."2'- In Sherman v. City of Seattle,"° the court ignored the classifi-
cations, saying that "regardless of the respondent's technical status-
be it that of invitee, licensee, or trespasser-the appellant owed him the
duty to use reasonable care,"'" and in Kidwell v. School Dist. No.
300,2- the court noted that although it had never discussed the matter,
it had always assumed that children on school premises were invitees.
Thus, in several instances, the court has demonstrated its ability to
manipulate the categories out of existence, or to avoid them when the
case requires. The United States Supreme Court recently alluded to
24 Dotson v. Haddock, 46 Wn2d 52, 59-60, 278 P2d 338, 342 (1955) did not discuss
the Clark case, and dismissed the statement in Christensen as dictum.
25 38 Vn.2d 864, 868, 233 P.2d 852, 855 (1951).
2 0 Haugen v. Central Lutheran Church, 158 Wash. Dec. 154, 361 P.2d 637 (1961).
Here, the plaintiff was voluntarily doing some work on the church when the scaffolding
upon which he was standing collapsed. The court said that Ward was decisive of the
issues presented, and reversed a judgment of dismissal, remanding for a new trial on the
theories set forth in Ward.
27 Squires v. McLaughlin, 44 Wn2d 43, 49, 265 P.2d 265, 269 (1953).
28 56 Wn.2d 807, 355 P.2d 781 (1960).
2 Id. at 820, 355 P.2d at 788.
30 57 Wn.2d 233, 356 P.2d 316 (1960.)
31 Id. at 233, 356 P.2d at 320.
32 53 Wn.2d 672. 355 P.2d 805 419591,
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and described this procedure in Kermarec v. Compagnie General
Transatlantique,3 where it pointed out that,
the common law courts have found it necessary to formulate increas-
ingly subtle verbal refinements, to create subclassifications among tradi-
tional common law categories, and to delieneate fine gradations in the
standards of care which the landowner owes to each. Yet, even in a
single jurisdiction, the classifications bred by the common law have
produced confusion and conflict. As new distinctions have become
spawned, older ones have become obscurred. Through this semantic
morass the common law has moved, unevenly and with hesitation,
towards imposing on owners and occupiers a single duty of reasonable
care in all circumstances. DICK STEINCIPHER
Recovery for Suicide-Wrongful Death. The Washington Supreme
Court, by a 5-to-4 decision in Orcutt v. Spokane County,1 made possible
recovery by wrongful death action for negligent conduct resulting in
suicide.
The plaintiff's decedent, while riding in a car driven by the defend-
ant, received severe injuries which allegedly resulted in her suicide one
year and nine months later. The administratrix of the deceased
brought an action for pain and suffering, medical and hospital expenses,
and wrongful death. Damages were allowed for pain and suffering and
for medical and hospital expenses under RCW 4.20.060 (thus present-
ing an interesting example of survival of damages for pain and suffering,
in Washington possible only in a wrongful death action). 2
On the wrongful death issue, the court held that where there is medi-
cal testimony concluding that the suicide was the immediate result of
an uncontrollable impulse ultimately caused by the defendant's negli-
gence, the issue of proximate cause is for the jury's determination.
Since the Washington court is one of the few to grant recovery for
suicidal death, a review of the legal developments in this area seems in
order. Starting with the basic proposition that a defendant's conduct
must have proximately caused an injury in order to make him liable,'
the general rule in the majority of suicide-wrongful death cases has
been to deny recovery.' Two theories support this result: (1) death by
suicide cannot logically be regarded as the natural and probable conse-
33358 U.S. 625, 631 (1961).
1158 Wash. Dec. 842, 364 P2d 1102 (1961).236 WAsH. L. REv. 331 (1961).
3 GRN, PROXIMATE CAUSE 132 (1927).
4 11 A.L.PR2d 751, 757 (1950).
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